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I
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DENNIS LOWER,

II
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?UPREME COURT

In .the $upreme Court of the State

VZtAAR W S O M , as trustee of the VILAXiR
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST,

1
1

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

TOPAZ MAJXBTING, L.P., and D E m S
LOWER,

1 '
1
1

1
1

0RX)ER AGUMEmNG APPEAL

1

NO, 35494

1

Defendants-Appel1mts.
___~------C__L1-------~w~~~~---------"-----~"--------

EARR WEST NESTMENTS,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

.>v.
TOPAZ MARKEimG, L.P., and MR. and
M R S , D E m LOWJE3,

)

1
1

Defendants-AppdIants.

A Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed February 15,2006, in appeaI

No. 32 146, Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P.; therefore,good cause appearing,

IT HEZZEBY IS OWER3ED that
AUG-NTED

to include

the Appeal Record in this case shall b.e

the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record .Elled in pxJor appeal

ITFUlU"r'ER IS CRDE
' mDthat the District Cam Clerk ghdl prepare and file a
LMJTED CLERK'S RECORD with t h i s Court, which shall contain the documen% requested in
the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not ,duplicate my riucument
included in the Clerk's R~oordfiled in prior appeal No, 32146.

IT FURTHER IS ORDE'R1JR that the Disttict Court Repoder shall prepare and
lodge a SUPfZ'fSMENTm RBPORTER'S T W S C W T with the District Court, whicb shall
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice: of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any
proceedings included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32146.

The

LIMITED CLERK'S Rl5CQR-D and REPOWER'S T W S C W T shall be filed with this Court

I

4

~
-

AUG. 22.

2008 12 : 30PM

aftm settlement.
to

IDA''.

CUPREME

COURT

NO, 4855

P. 3

M a ,the exGbits submitted in prior appeal Nb. 32146, which were returned

Pistricr; COWon March 27, 2007, *%axe not covered by this Order and they will n0.t be sent to

the Supreme Court unless specifically requested by the parties. The party requesting any or all

of the prior exhibits must specifically designate those exhibits being requested.

DATED this 16&day of July 2008 ,.

Pop. the Supreme.Court

Dorothy ~ e a p e p u t Clerk
y
for
Stephen W.
yon7Clerk
cc: Counsel ofRecord

District Court- Clerk
Disbjct Court Reporter

Kenneth E.. Lyon, Jr.
A t t o r n e y a t Law
P . 0 . Box 4866
P o c a t e l l o , I D 83205
(208) 233-1240
A t t o r n e y for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH J U D I C I A L DISTRICT O F THE
,STATEOF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

V i l a r r Ransom, as T r u s t e e
O f t h e Vilarr 3 . Ransom

1
1

Revocable T r u s t

1
)
)

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

1
Topaz M a r k e t i n g , L . P . ,

and,

D e n n i s Lower,

I

)

1
Defendants.

Case No. 03-000239

&

000240

1
)

Farr West I n v e s t m e n t s ,
f
1
1

Plaintiff,

)
i

. VS.

Topaz M a r k e t i n g , L . P . ,
Mr. and M r s . Dennis Lowex

f
.

1
)

Defendants.
1

COMES NOW the defendants, by and t h r o u g h t h e i r
'

attorney,

Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. and pursuant t o ~ u l e 4O,(d)
'
(I), Idaho Rules
of Civil P r o c e d u r e , moves t h e C o u r t f o r an O ~ d e rD i s q u a l i f y i n g the

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 1

Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, in the above entitled
matter.
Dated this 3rd day of January, 2007.

Attorney for Defe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd
day of January, 2007, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY to the following by placing the same in the
.U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon:
F. Randall Kline
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
427 N. Main Street, Ste. L
P.O. Box 397
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397

@ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Judge Don L. Harding
Resident Chambers
159 S. Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276

j3a U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Express Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Fax

By:

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 2

(

)

( )
( )

Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

F. Randall Mine (ISB#2787)
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
427 N. Main Street, Ste. L
P.O. Box 397
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397
Telephone: (208) 232-9007
Facsimile: (208) 234-4654
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

)

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

vs.

1
1

TOPAZ MARKETING LP, ET AL.

1

Defendants,

CASENO. CV-03-240

AMENDED OBJECTION TO
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

1

1
VEARR RANSOM, as trustee of the
Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. CV-03-239

1

VS.

TOPAZ MARKETING LP, ET AL.
Defendants.

)

1
)

AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

Page 1

COMES NOW Farr West Investments through their attorney of record, F. Randall Kline
of F. Randall Nine, Chartered, and hereby objects to Motion to Disqualify submitted by the

Defendants on January 3,2007.
It is submitted that subsection F of Rule 40 (d)(l) i s not applicable based on the remand
for additional findings. See Liebelt v. Liebelt, I25 Idaho 302, 870 P.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994). After
reviewing Jones v. State, it appears that the head note contained in the annotated portion bf the

I.R.C.P. is incorrect, see attached Exhibit A. The actual case is the case fotlowing Jones, which is
Liebelt v. Liebe, 12.5Idaho 302, 870 P.2d 9 (Cf.App. 1994). The Liebelt case addresses Rule

IT IS THEREFORE respecthll y ssubmltted that Judge Harding should not be disqualified
in the above-entitled matter based upon the remand far addition findings submitted by the Idaho
Supreme Court.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2007.

/
CHARTERED

AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTFY that on the 26th day of April, 2007; 1 served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed below, postage prepaid thereon, in the
manner indicated below:

Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr.
Attorney At Law
P.O. Box 4866
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Honorable Don L. Harding
Resident Chambers
CARTlBOU COUNTY COURTHOUSE
159 S. Main
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276

AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

X

X

U.S. Mail
Express Mail
Rand Delivery
Fax

U.S. Mail
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

Page 3

IDAHO COURT RULES

Grounds.

Name of Judge.

be understood as founded upon his view that

Post-Conviction Relief.
W h e r e petition for post-conviction relief
was never actually served with ~ i o t i c eof a
hearing - 8% i s expressly contemplated by
the rules
u n t i l after his motion for. change
ofjl.idge was filed, his in-custody, uncounselcd
appearance before the court was not a proper
suhstitilte for the service r e q u i r e d by the
rulcs: tt~ererorc, i t ivould not have been
proper for the ctju1.t to ticlly his motion for a

Review ofAgsncy Decisions.
Subsection ( I , ( i i o f t h i s rule, precluding the
disqualification without cause of a judge sitting in an appcitate capacity, is applicable to
district judges conducting judicial review of
state o r local agency actions urrder thcridministrntive Prucetiutus Act. Arthur v. Sl~oshunr
County, 133 Idaho 851,993 P.2d 617 ( C t . 'APP.
2000).

-

324

Jones that Flaten had already m d e an attempt to arrest Jones a t his residence.
Jones initially refused to make a statement,
Although Jones had thus invoked his right to
remain silent, Flaten continued to questioh
him. Jones relented and gave a statementocly after Flaten said Jones would be arrested if he did not "help" Flaten. After Jones

seek suppression of a confession to the
charged crime. Therefore, Jones' evidence
on both elements of the two-part test
ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in'
Strickland v. Washington, 456 U.S. 668,
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (19&1), is SUEcient to preclude sumrnzq dismissal of his
claim,

was significantly restrained and that he was
not free to leave.

tion,

The majority relies upon the fact that
Jones went to the police station volunta~ily
and that after making his statement he was.
aliowd to leave. While those facts are relevant, they are not determinative. See, e.g.
Unitecl States v. DiGinco.nto, sztpn; State v.
Z~>~~titlslie,
804 5.W.2d 851 (Mo.Ct.App.
1991); People zv. Horn, 790 P.2d 816 (Colo.
. 1990). The Miraadn doctrine addresses circumstances where pressures exerted by the
police impail* a detainee's abiiity to exercise
his privilege against self-inelimination. Beykentel; 468 U.S. at 481, 104 S.Ct. at 3148.
Therefore, the psimury focus must be upon
the reasonabIe state of mind of the individual
when the incriminating statement was given-not on wllat happened before the questioning began or after it was concluded.

for

870 ~ . 2 d9

Carol hI. LIEBELT, PlaintiffRespondent,

Kenneth H. LIEBELT, DefendantKO. 2 0 1 i l .

Coicrt of Appeals of Itial~rj.
March 3 , 1994.

If a police interrogation were conducted as

Further, the evldence js sufficient to raise a
factual issue as td whether Jones' defense

County, H. Reynold George, J., adopted
magistrate's findings of Fact and affirmed

LIEBELT v, LIEBELT
Cfteas 125 Idaho 302 (App,)

?main to be prov?tent evidence, he
hearing where he
h proof. Accordistrict court's orJones' application
~ n dremand this
k g to determine
rg statement was
M i ~ a n d uTights
ctolxey was defisuppression mo-

,

,,

1

7J

Plaintiff-

,
,

:

Defendant-

mnciu~ionsof law. Appeals were taken. 5. Appeal and Error -964
The Court of Appeals, 118 Idaho 845, 801
Denial of motion to disqualify judge or
p ~ $2,
d reversed in part and remanded. On magistrate for cause b reviewed under abuse
magistrate found volunta1.~ ababan- of discretion standard.
donment of agreement and reaffrmed divi6. Judges e 4 9 ( 1 )
sion of property. Former husband appealed.
Adverse rulings in case do not disqualify
The District Court, Mawin M. Smith, J.,
magistrate's decision, Former bus- judge; in order to be ground for disqualificaband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wal- tion, bias must stem from judge forming
ters, C.J., held that: (I) recusai of magistrate opinion on merits of case on some basis other
for cause was unnecessary; (2) evidence es- than what has been learned from presiding
*blished voluntary abandonment of prenup- Over it. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 40(d)(2).
tiaI agveement; . and 13) abandonment issue 7- Husband and Wife e33
,VS tried by implied consent of parties.
Evidence in dit-orce case established
abandonment of prenuptial agseement by not
Affimed.
following it during marriage; contrary to
requirements of agreement, heither husband
I. Appeal and Error *1082(1), 1 0 9 W
nor \@fe signed or delivered papers to transtt%ere issues before Court of Appeals fer ownership of separate propel%y or to
are same as those considered by district show joint ownership of it, appointed appraistout sitting in appellate capacity, court of er a t time of separation, or sought to divide
Appeals will review trial record with due property in manner prmided in agreement,
regard for, but independently from, district and husband unilaterally cancelled stock purcourt's decision and will defer to findings of chase plan and investment plan contrary to
fact which are based. on substantial, although aseement.
conflicting, eb-idence.
8. Husband and Wife -33
2. Aooeal
and Error b S l j
*.
I n e n esercise of discretion is reviewed
on appeal, Cowt of Appeals inquires (1)
whether iower court rightly perceived issue
&? one of discretion; (2) whether court acted
~ithinbounclaries of such discretion and consistently nith any legal standarcls applicable
specific choices; and (3) whether court
reached tlecision by exercise of reason.
3. Justices of the Peace *57(fJ

''ille P'antiW right to clistjualif~judge
m;11:istr,ale nithout cause if new trial h ~
Ol-dered does not apply to remapd for
limiird ])lLl.gOSe of having madstrate make
a d ( i i t i ~ \t-riiien
~ ~ ~ l findings on particular is.wes of fact which have already been tried.
civ.Proc,, Rule 4O(d)(X)(F).
Or

t' Idaho.

tl cl~ailenge,.ed
va:it. F'sed Snook

Husband and d f e understood or should
have understood that evidence at divorce tria1 concernjng noncompliance uith prenuptiai
agreement v a s aimed at issue of abandonment; wife's trial brief alLguedthat abandonment by consent coulcl be impiiecl from acts
of parties or inconsistent acts. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule I5(b).
9. Cohstitutionai Lair;,-314
Exercising clisclbetion to clecicle whether
issue was tried hy implied consent of parties
,nust be consistel-it nith due pl.ocess requires
that pal.tjes heye s l r ~ ~ j c i e n ~
of
issues before
oppoitunit)- to ad.
and argudress those issues iljth
ment. Rules Cir,proc., Rule 15(b); K.S.C.A.
~
~
~
~5, 14.t
.
~
~
~
~

,

~

,

$0. Constitu tionaI Lax -811)

Introduction of evidence relevant to isBias or. pr-ejrrdice warranting recusal for
QUse \VaS not demonstrated by magistrate's
ct ancl affirmed

,

sue nqt raised by pleadings does not satisfy

due process requirement of notice of issues
pleaded issue to be tried by implied consent.
i
1

i

125 IDAHO REFORTS

Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(b); U.S.C.A.. Const,
Amends. 5, 14.

XI. Pleading @=310
court may not base decision On
inm~leadedissue where nothing in

parties began litigating the enforceabjli
that agreement. At trial, the magis
held that the agreement was void and d
the parties' assets under state law. Ken
appealed, contending that the agreement
M d and enforceable, and alternatively,

Rules Civ.v.Proc., Rule 15Cb).
12. Divorce *I86

port such findings; although Court of Apagreement, it merely observed limited role in
reviewing factual issues.
13. Divorce -286181
Where magistrate has set out to achieve
equality in property division, divorce decree
upon substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence
that parties have received substantially equal
shares. I.C. $ 32-712.

When remanding the case, we stated:

ries was argued at trial.. The record do
not clearly indicate whether the parti
tract. . .. w e r a n h d
it is within its discretion to
should be supplemented, in order to rn
the required findings of fact and con
trial. court determines that the agre
was valid, the court is directed to

John Ohman argued.
Edward W. Pike and Todd R. Erikson,
Idaho Falls, for respondent, Todd R. Erik-

the parties7 intentions as governed by th
prenuptial agreement.
Id., at 849, 801 P.2d at 56.

Kenneth subsequently Bed a motion to
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
disqualify the magistrate, who had presided
This is an appeal following a remand for over the originaltrial from deciding the issupplemental findings in a divorce action. sues on remand. The magistrate denied
ks in the fist apped, the cerltral issue con- motion. Based upon the exmisting evidentiw
cerns the magistrate's decision to set aside record, and after considering the written and
the parties' prenuptial. agreement. Based oral arguments of counsel, the magistrate
upon the magistrate's supplemental findings, issued supplemental findings and conclusions.
we now affirm the magistrate's divorce de- He held that the parties had not litigated the
cree. In so doing, we also uphold the magis- issue of rescission, but that the theory of
trate's division of the parties' property, an abandonment had been tried by their implicit
issue raised but not reviewed in the earlier consent. Re then found that the parties had
appeal.
voluntarily abandoned the agreement and reaffirmed his division of the p e i e s ' prope~%Y.
Facts and Procedural Background.
Kenneth appealed to the district coW6
Carol and Kenneth Liebelt entered into a which, sitting in its appellate capacity, upheld
prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage the magistrate's decision. This apped folin 1986. Upori their divorce in 1987, the lowed.

LIEBELT v. LIEBELT
Clte as 125 Idaho 302 (App.)

I. The magistrate correctly declined to
recuse himself from the proceedings
on remand.

Issues on Appeal.
this appeal, Kenneth raises the folaw1. Did the magistrate em in declining to

recuse himself from the proceedings on
2, Did the magistrate err in finding that

the parties had in fact abandoned their

':

onrnent or

ated:
the record
:hese theo,ecord does
:he parties
n the con, court that
determine
ufficient, or
!er to make
2nd conclue event the
agreement
,C] to divide
rclance with
rned by the

3. Did the magistrate err in finding that
the theory of " ~ ~ a n d o n m e n t had
"
been
tried by consent of the parties?

4. Did the magistrate err in dividing the
parties' property?

I
>:

I

"

.

Standard of Review.

'.

[I, 21 Where, as here, the issues before
us are the same as those considered by the

:

-,

motion to
: ~ i lpresidecl
ding the is? clenied the
: evidentiii~'~
n-ritten and
magistsi~te
conclusions.
litigated the
ie theory of
[heir itnpIicit
! parties had
.

district cowt sitting in an appellate capacity,
we ~vill review the trial record with due
regard for, but independently from, the district court's decision. Liebelt 1, 118 Idaho a t
8J7, 801 P.2d at 54. We will defer to findings of fact which are based on substantial,
although conflicting, evidence. Id. The trial
court's discretionary decisions will be upheld
absent a showing that the court abused its
discretion. See Bell zt. Be& 122 Idaho 520,
83.5 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App.1992). When an exercise of discretion is ~eviewedon appeal, we
inquire (1) whether the lower court rightly
pcrqceiveilthe issue as one of discretion; 12)
l v h ~ t h e rthe court acted within the bound:uies of such discretion and consistently nith
legal standwds applicable to specific
choices; anc1 (3) 11-hether the court reached
its< ciecision by an esercise of reason. 5'11)~
~'~jllr!j
Siropping Cejlter, 1 ) ~v.. Idaho Po~cer.
('',-. I19 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000
(iIJ!fl). It'ith respect tri the trial court's conclusions of lair, bho~vevez+,we exercise free
rccie\t.. Liebelt 1, 118 Idaho at 841, 801 P.2d
a\ 9+
' b

Tkc Rutc provides:
nlotiwtr for disqualification without cause
must bc filed not later than seven (7) days after
Ijcr~iccof a writtea nolice or order setting the
action For status conference, trial or for hearlng on the first contested motion, or not iater
than iwcnp-one 121) days after service or re-

'

131 We first consider Kenneth's threshold
clGm that the
have re,used himself fmm deciding the issues on
remand. Kenneth asserts that the remand
ordered by this Court triggered his right
under L.R.C.P. 40(dl(l) to disqualify the magistrate upon request. Re relies on subsection (F) of that rule which grznts to each
party the right, upon a timely motion, to
disqualify one dish.ict judge or
without cause where a "r-ierv trial has been
ordered." I.R.C.P, 40(d)[l)(F), However,
we did not remand the case for a "new trial."
As our opinion makes clear, we remanded the
case for the limited purpose of having the
magistrate make additional mitten findings
on particular issues of fact which had already
been tried before him. Accordingly, Rule
40(d)(l)(F) did not apply to @.ant Kenneth an
automatic right to disqualify the magistrate
without cause.
Furthermolt, Kenneth's motion to disquaiify withaut cause appears to have been untimely under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B).' The motion was docketed on March 14, 1991, more
than twenty-one aays after this Court filed
the remittitur ordeling the remand, and
more than seven days after the magistlate's
order for scheduling. Therefore, the motion
to disqualify without cause was p~operlydenied on tlre additional ground that it xvas
untimely.

[a-61 Kenneth also contencls that the
magistrate was biased 01- pr-ejudiced against
him personally and should ha1.e recused himself "for cause" under I.R.C.P. 40(df(I?).The
denial of a motion to disqualify for cause is
revietved under an abuse of discretion stalldard. Bell V. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 835 P.2d
1331 (Ct.App.1992). Kenneth argues that
the magistrate exceedeil the botrndaries of
his discretion by failing ta find, under the
ceipt of a complaint, summons, order or othcr
pleading indicating or specifying who the prcsiding judge or mngistratc to ~ i t caction will be.
E.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B). The rcrnittilur ordcrin:: the
casc remandcd was filed December 15. 1990;
the magistrate's subsequent ordcr for scheduling
on remand was dated January 29. 1991.

'

125 IDAHO REPORTS

.applicable legal standard, that he was biased
and prejudiced. See X,R.C,P. 40(d)(Z)(A)(4).
Kenneth maintains that bias is clearly demonstrated by the record of the Md proceedings in which the magistrate issued a contempt order and 'awarded attorney fees

proceedings. He further found that heither
party had objected to the other's noncompliance, and that, accordingly, the parties had
voluntarily abandoned the agreement. Disputing these findings, Kenneth denies he i ~ .
tended to bando on the prenuptial agreement, :

tion, must stem from the judge forming an
opinion on the merits of the case on some
basis other than what has been learned from
presiding over the case, See e,y., United
States v. G?innell Co?.p., 384 U.S. 563, 86
S.Ct, 1698, 16 L.Ed.Zd 778 (1966); Rosen v.
Sziyarina?~,357 F.2d 794 (2nd Cir.1966).

their agreement.

'

strates that the prenuptial agreement rvas

.%

doned their prenuptial agreement.

stated in LdebeIt I:
A contract is abandoned where the acts of
liith the exisone
are
tence of the contl-act and are accluiesced in
by the other party. AbanGonment of the
contract is a question of intent. Such intent can be shoirn by cot~espondingconduct a s demonstrated by surrounding facts

We conclude that the evidence of the parties' concluct was sufficient to enable the
magistrate to infer that the parties hati abandoned their aneement. Because substantial
evidence supports the magi;istt.ilte's fincling,
n-e nil1 not disturb that finding on al)peal,

donment may be implied from the parties'
actions.
118 Idaho at 849, 801 P.2~1at 56 {citations

"abandonment" had been tried by con.
sent of the parties.

By its supplemental findings, the magistrate found that the prenuptial agreement
was not put in place by either df the parties'
during their marriage, and that they had not

.

that the magistlate erred in using the theo!?'
of abandonment-a theory not raked in the ,
pleadings-to set aside the prenuptial W e p
rnent. In the suppiemental finclings isWd '.

,

LIEBELT v, LIEBELT
Ctteas

I25 Idaho 502 (App.)

ties had implicitky consented to litigate the
\;sue of abandonment.. Kenneth denies he
e\.el' consented to try the issue of abanddnrnent, expressly or implicitly. He argues
that the magistrate's contrmy holding is unby the record and must be re-

Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Rufes of Civil
p1-ocedur.e provides that "where issues not
rdised by the pleading are tl'kd by express
or implied consent of the padies, they shall
be treated in all respects as if t h q had been
raised in the pleadings. . . ." 1.R.C.P. 15(5).
Although this
specifies tbatWhen a theeof recovery is tried fuliy fry h e parties the
tliai coud may base its decision on that
theory and deem the pleadings amended ac"
by eith.)ler excordingb, an issue not
press or implied consent cannot be the basis
of the decision. M.K. Transport, Inc. u.
Crouer, 101 Idaho 345, 612 P.2d 1192 (1980).
[9-111 The determination whether an issue not raised by the pleadings was tried by

.
.

Idaho at. 849, 801 P.2d a t 56, the magistrate
was precluded from finding, upon the identical, unsupplemented record on remand, that
the parties had in fact consented. We disagree. Xn remanding the case for additional
findings, we merely observed our llmited role
in reviewing factual issues. As explained by
our. Supreme Court,
The absence of findings and condusions
may be disregarded by the appeHate caud
is
and yieIds
07zJywhere fie
& ~ o u sanaver to Ule relevant question. . , , Absent such chcumstances, the
failure of the
court to make findings
of fact and canc]nsions of law concerning
issues arising from the pleadthe
ings, upon which proof is offer&, ~ $ ne1
cessihte a reversal of.the judgment and a
remand for additional findings and conclusions,., .

! : tI : !

Pope v. Internzoztntai?~Gas Co., 103 Idaho
217, 226, 646 P.2d 988, 996 11982! [empbads

!!

:!

arj8nal).

the implied consent of the parties involves a
discretionary decision of the trial court,
By declining t o decide on appeal whether
t y ~ c hv. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238, 561 P.2d 880 the parties had consented to try the issue of
(1977); Mikesell v. Nezt.zuorld Den COT., 122 abandobrnent, we did not conclude that the
idaho 868,840 P.Zd 1090 (Ct.App.1992). The record was inadequate to support a such
exercise of discretion must be consistent with finding. Rather, we concluded only that the
the due process requirement, as conternplat- record did not yield an "obvious answel." to
ecl by Rule 1B(b), that the parties have suffi- this inherently factual question. Accordingcient notice of the issues before the court and ly, we remanded the case for the magistrate
an opportunity to address those issues wjth to make the necessary determinations as the
c;.idence and armment. Ross v. Colenza~i trier of fact.
rf).lac. 114 ~ d s i i o817,761 P.2d 1169 (1988): - Yoyeover, L\-e naa caneiurle that the record
K. Twasport. Ixe. 101 Idaho a t 349, 61.2 %*as sufficienUy
to
to both parP.31 at 1196. Kotice of an issue is not .
ties that the theory OF abandonment XTas
p~tiibiishedmerely because evidence relevant
before
the court. In her triai brief, Carol
to that issue was introduced; it must appear
argued:
1)arties understood that the evidence was
neither party ever implemented the terms
;kinictl a t the unpieaded issue, no.ss, 113
of the agreement by either deeding OK"
i(l;i)~oa t 82Y, ,761 p . 3 1179; ;M.K Tvnllsassigning
by bilf of sale or appropriate
o l i t i , I,((:, 201 Idaho at 349, 612 p.2d at 1196,
other
docurnet~t
an utxlivided one-half inH c ~ ~ c ite , is error for the trial ~ 0 u l . tto base
terest in the separate pl.opel-tg of each
it..; [~ccision on an unpieaded issue tyhe3.e
other [as required by the terms o f the
""thing in the yecord indicates that the issue
'rLi.c
litigated a t tl.inf. M.X. ~ m ~ t s j l o , ~j , t c . ,
agreement}. This brings into questian . . .
was the agreement duly impiemehted or
[(Iaho at 849, 612 P.2d at 1196.
did the patties meretp agree to something
ilz1 Kenneth avers that because this
that. they nei'kr follolved through on until
Cotlt+tin Liebtlt I held that "the zeeord does
the time
clearly indicate &ether the parties intended to abandon theb agreement," 118
.

I'
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.

.

.

A rescision [sic] or abandonment by consen'
be ' ~ ~ ' e d f i 'he
o8'~'' of the
parties 0.1. from inconsistelzt acts.
Plaintiffs triai biief, at 6, 7 (emphasis add-

parties' community property which, absent a
finding of "compelIing reasons," was in error, &#,
See I.C. $ 32-712. W e note, however, that in $${i.
his findings and coneivsions tile rnagishak @
:
.q r ~
expressly held that "the community propefiy ?+
of the parties should be allocated and diaded '?$:

edf.

implicitly tried by the parties.

Dividing the parties' property.

enforceability of the prenuptial apeement
nrere needed, and the possibility existed that
the propetty ~ ~ u have
l d to be rediv5ded a s a
consequence of those findings. Thus, in re-

from the magistpate's finding that, ijul.jng the
period o f
sepa,.ation,
p-enneth had a
disposable income of $12.~4;~,34,
n.herea
Carol's net disposable income foIa the same

agreement was unenforceable, and conse-

awards be amended to take into account the :

ing issues which coufd have becn, birr rvitich were

outcome, on remand.

LIEBELT v, LIEBELT
Clte as 125 Idaho 302 [hpp.)

disparity in those eernings. Denying Carol's
request, the magistrate made clear that he
did not intend to allocate the salaries. Rathgr, the relevance of the finding concerning
pior salaries was to demonstrate that Kennethls excesshe spendingmand not his lack
of income-had caused the community to incur a substantial indebtedness during the
parties' separation. The magistrate held
Kenneth solely responsible for this debt, because Kenneth had incurred the debt in violation of the court's earlier restraining order,
which required that Kenneth "refrain from
inculTing any community debt during the
pendency of this action."

e set out
itision of
icier I.C.
r s set out
.I( not be
.~ponsub, that the
,Lly equal
;~rger,107
,9541.
i substahd n g that
clered his
ivided be,leal: from
; to derive
during the
;tk had a
whereas
the same

:
I

Conclusion

.

:ver., Ken~ t etreated
.t simply is

'he record
incomes
.y tiivisi~n.
yomplained

$5

Jrn sai;ti-les
e pt'ri[?eI'tl.'
;

property

''

~ I C C O L the
I~~

395 (ci.dpp.
r-c thc appcl;,cal, but rhis
,ending addihc uncertain

We have reviewed the property division
and conclude that Kenneth has failed to demonstrate that it was not substantially equal.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the magistrate's division of the property in the divorce
decree.

.d

f
:s

::$.

We conclude that the magistrate properly
denied the motion to recuse himself in the

proceedings on remand, We further hold
that the magistrate did not err in finding
that the parties had abandoned their prenuptial agreement, and that the magistrate did
not eM: in determining that such theory had
been kied
.~
~ c we~conclude
s e
that Kenneth has failed to demonstrate enor
in the prope~%y
division, we also uphold that
portion of the magistrate,s decree, Accord-

the decree of divorce.
*gly, we iffurn
Respondent, Carol Liebelt, is entitled to an
award of her costs as provided in I.A.R. 40.
NO attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

LANSING and PERRY, JJ., concur.

.
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1N THE DISTRICT GOUlaT OFTHE SIXTH JUDICIAL DlST
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
**rxrt
--

--

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,
Plaintiff,
VS

Case No, CV-2003-240

.

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
NIR, and MRS, DENNIS LOWER,,

Defendants,
DATE: April 26,2007

Randall Kline, A#crrnsy for Plaintiff
Kenneth E, Lyon Jr., Attorney for Defendant

APPEARANCES:

MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Motion to DisquaItQ

PROCEEDINGS: At the outset thc Court heard oral argument from respective crrunsel regarding

tha said motiorz, and theresfler took the same under advisement,
Dated this ~ 6day
'~
of Aprll, 2007.

a$w,
DON L. HARDING
District Judge

-

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 1

4 22PM FgAJ!'"r
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CERTIFICATE OF MAlLlNGlSERVlCE
I hereby certify that on April 26, 2007, 1 mailedlse~vod/faxeda true copy of the foregoing
document on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage lhereoh or
causing the same to be hand delivered.

AitornevlstlPersonls~:

Method of Sewice:

Randall Kline
Attorney for Plaintiff

Faxed to: 234-4654

Kenneth E. Lyon Jr,
Attorney for Defendant

Faxed to: ' 232-8867

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN,Clerk

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER. 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,
Plaintiff,
VS.

TOPAZ MARKETING L.P., and, Dennis
Lower,

) Case Nos.
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-2003-0000239
CV-2003-0000240

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

)

Defendants.
)

VILARR RANSOM, as trustee of the Vitarr B. )
Ransom Revocable Trust,
1
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

TOPAZ MARKETING L.P., and, Dennis
Lower,

1
1
1
)
)

Defendants.
)

This matter is back before the Court oh Defendants' Motion to Disqualifj, filed on
January 3,2007. This matter has been previously tried before this Court, and the Court's
decision was appeaied. The ldaho Supreme Court vacated some of the Court's findings,

Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., et al. Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendants' Motion to Disqualify

MAY. 31. 2 0 0 7 1 0 : 0 2 A M

Jl'par
HARDING

reversed some, and remanded the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on
the subject of the measure of damages for the trespass found by this Court. Ransom v.

TopazMarketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641 (2006). After remand, Defendants moved to
disqualify the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)'. Plaintiffs objected the motion, citing

Liebelt v, tiebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (Ct,App, 1994) as authority to deny the motion because
the case was not remanded for a new trial, merely for additional fmdings of ffao. This
Courl agrees, and therefore denies the motion.

A motion pursuant to LR,C.P. 40(d)(l)(F) may be filed by a party to disqualify
the previously presiding judge after an order for a new trial, whether by order of the trial
court or of an appellate court. The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does not order a
new trial. It remands the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the
measure of damages for trespass. By the clear language of the rule, it does not apply to
this case.

The Idaho Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Liebelt. There, the
Court held the rule did not apply when a case was remanded for additional findings of
fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of Appeals held &at is not a "new trial" for operation
of the rule. This case was also remanded for additional findings of fact, not for a new
trial. In that regard this case and Liebelt are very sitnilar, and similar results should
obtain, The Court will not grmt the motion to disqualify.

In addition, judicial economy also justifies the denial of this motion, This Court
has previously heard the evidence in this case and made the findings which are to be
supplemented. This Court is in the best position to make those additional findings, A
new judge will, be required to spend a significant amount of additional time to become
familiar with the matter so as to make the additional findings required, and would be
placed in the position of having to determine the justifioation for the award of damages
granted by this Court without having the benefit of this Court's experience with the case.

'

No subsection of Rule 40(d)(l) was specified in the motion, howev'er, ~ i v m
the remand from the Idaho
Supreme Court, it i s assumed that subsection (F) is the applicable subseotion.

Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., et 81. Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendants' Motlon to Disqusllfy

MAY. 31.

2007 10: 02AM

JIln^"ARD1NG

This Court is simply in the best position to make the additional findings of fact required

by the Supreme Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED for the forgoing
reasons, Defendants' Motion to Disquala@ is DENIED,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

n

DATED this &day

of May, 2007.

District Judge

Farr West Inve$tmentsv. Topaz Marketing, LS., e l 81. Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendants' Motion to Disqualify

at

f
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2007 10:02AM
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CLERIC'S CERTUFllCATE OR SERVICE

I KEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I sewed a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing document on the attomey(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated.
Attorney(s)iPersons(s):

Method of Service:
[ 1 U:S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
.H
Facsimile
[ J Hand Deiivered
[ 1 Court Box

F.Randall Kline
F.RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
427 North Main Street, Suite L
Post Office Box 397
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397
Telephone: (208) 232-9007
Facsimile: (208) 234-4654
Kenneth E, Lyon, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 4866
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Telephone: (208) 233-1240
Facsimile: (208) 232-8867
DATED this

[ ] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid
[ 1 overnight Mall

J-fkcsimite
[ 1 Hand Delivered
[ ] Court Box
day of May, 2007.

V.ELLIOTT LARSEN
Clerk of the District Court
By:
~ g u t Clerk
y
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,

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS

1
)

pittinti%
vs.

TOPAZ MARICETINO L.P., and Dennis
Lower,
Defendants.

j
1
1

1

..,,.,,

,

Case Nos. CV-03-0000239
CV-03-0000240

MEMORANDUM DECISION

AND ORDER

)

1

r
I

VILARR RANSOM,as trustee of the Vilan )
B, Ransom Revocable Trust,
1
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

1

VB.

TOPAZ IvIARKEmG L.P., and Dennis
Lower,
Defendants.

)
)

1
)

THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT:
This case having been remanded back to this Court from the Idaho Supreme Court on the
issues of: 1) what damage was the natural effect of creating the easement and what damage was
excessive, unnecessary and compensable under the law, and 2) the amount to be awarded for any
permanent damages to the land determined by the difference of the fair market value before and
afta the injury, or the amount to be awarded for temporaty injuries to the land, now comes
before this Court,

Far West V, Topaz, Memorandum Recision and Order
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The first issue is addressed by looking at the injuries to the land including; erosion, cuts
made by Defendant in the land outside of the granted easement, removal and deposit of soil to
and &om Plaintiff's land, grading, cutting trees, placing gravel, removal of fences, and exceeding
tbe scope of the easement. Damages to the property which are not compensable are the injuries
which are a natural effect of creating or imptoving the easement. These include; grading, cutting
trees, plming gravel and removal of obstructing fences within the easement. The Supreme Court
has said that the easement may be modified according to the granted easement. Ransom v. Topaz
MarkcetingL.P.,143 Idaho 641,645 (2006). Thus this Court will not award any damages directly

caused by these actions. However where the modifications constitute an enlargement of the use
or .anunreasonable increase in the burden of the easement on the subservient estate then the
resulting injuries may be compensable. Abbott v. Nampa SchoolDist No, 131,119 Idaho 544
(Idaho 1991). The Supreme Court in remanding this case has instructed how to compensate for
excessive and unnecessary injuries. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 644-645.

The injuries which are compensable because they are excessive and unnecessary we the
permanent and temporary damages which do not naturally arise from the moditoations of the
easement. These include the erosion snd sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land
outside the easement and also the removal and deposit: of soil on Plaintiff's

land and Defendants

failure to install culverts or otherwise mitigate the altered and inmeased flow of water onto
Plaintiff's land outside the easement. An example of this kind of injury to Plaintiff's land is
found in the fact that 50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly graveled area and
thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiff's land. The sloughing caused by the
increase of water has rendered the land useless for building or cultivating. This is an

Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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unreasonable increase in 'the burden on the subservient estate and the Court feels that some
damages should be awarded,
The second issue deals with computation of the damages to be awarded and requires the
Court to distinguish between temporary and permanent damages. This case is unique because
there is an overlap of the permanent and temporary injuries to the land. An example ofthis is the
sloughing which has occurred on the land. The sloughing has caused some of the fiIl dirt to be
washed down stream and lost forever, however the sloughing may be remedied as indicated by
the proposals of Biggs Enterprises. While the injuries to the land which ate continuing in nature
and not abatable are permanent injuries, the eontiiued sloughing can be abated if the land is put
back to its natural state. This makes the distinction of the damages difficult as it fits both
categories to an extent. The Court feels that the loss of the soil due to the erosion is a permanent
injury to the land as flar as that soil i s unreooverable. This has also made the land impossible to
farm as the loss of soil proves detrimental to the objective. The sloughing has made the land
useless, kthermore the soil which has been lost and the pristine nature of the land has been lost
forever. Thus the loss of soil is a permanent injury.
The Supreme Court has instructed that the measure of these permanent damages be
assessed by a computation of the fair market value of the land immediately prior to the injury
and the fair market value of the land immediately following the injury.Ransom,143 Idaho 641 at

645. The Plaintiffs have not proved any diminution of Me property value as a result of the
permanent injuries to the land therefore this Court cannot award such damages.
However, as mentioned above there are temporary injuries involved in this case as well,
Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this case are the cuts made on Plaintiff's land
outside of the easement, without permission, the heloughing and pooling caused by the cuts, and

Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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the removal and deposit of soil onto Plaintiffs land. According tc the estimate provided by Biggs,
these can be restored to their natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling and
measures can be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the land to its pre-injury
state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in nature and can be compensated for by
awarding tha amount necessary to restore the land to its condition prior to the injury. The
Supreme Court has stated, "mf the cause of the injury is abatable or preventable and the injury
capable of rectification by reasonable restoration, i.e., not exceeding the damage to the properly,
the injury will be considered temporary and not permanent." Alesko v. Union Pacpc Rtailroad
Go., 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can be rectified the damages are only
temporary. In actions of temporary injury to land, the owner is entitled to recover amount
necessary to repair injury and put land in condition it was at time immediately preceding injury.
Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, (Ct.App. 1997) In regard to temporary injury .to property, if
the cost of restoration exceeds the value ofthe premises in theti? original condition, or in the

diminution in market value, the latter are the limits of recovery; however, because the goal of
compensatory damages is reimbursement of the actual loss suffered, the rule precluding recovery
in excess of the diminution in value is not of invariable application. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at
645, citing; Nampa &Meridian Irrtgation Dist., 139 Idaho 28 at 33-34 (2003).

In this case because there is overlap ofthe permanent and temporary injuries this Court
would award the amount submitted by Biggs Enterprises which estimated the cost of repair to be
$42,685.00,This amount would remedy the temporary injuries and prevent any further
permanent injuries to the land. However, it exceeds the value of the land because only
approximately 7 acres were injured and the land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of
$26,600.00,The bid also addresses problems of both apermanent and temporary nature as it

Fan West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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encompasses the filling of the cuts as well as remedying the loss of soil and continued sloughing.
Plaintiff must prove the diminution of value in his property as a limit to compensatory damages
for temporary damages as well as for permanent damages. Id. Plaintiff has failed to prove any.
However, this seems be one of the very situations which the Supreme Court had anticipated

when the standards of the application of the diminution value limit was relaxed under Numpa &
Meridian Irrigation Rist .Id,
The land in its current condition is not suitable to build on, nor is it capable of being
cultivated. Despite the diminution of the land's value not being proved, the value of the land has
been proved, Therefore, the Court will award that value in the mount of $26,600.00, While this
amount mll not completely restore the Plaintips premises to their original condition, this
amount will help put the Plaintiff's land back to the condition which it once was and make it
useful again. Thus, it will remedy the temporary damages while abating any future sloughing
damages and it is in harmony vith the parameters of the law and the Supreme Cowt's direction.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDOED that based upon the findings
and law set forth by the Supreme Court and the facts of this case, the Cou*t hereby ftads that the
Defendant did in fact injure the Plaintiff's land in excess of the modifications. The injury of soil
loss to the Plaintiffs land was of a permanent nature in%at it caused water erosion that has
\

rendered the property unsuitable for its natural use and is continuing in nature. The damages for
the permanent injuries were not proved during the hearings and therefore the Court cannot award

damages for the permanent injuries. Other injuries to the land resulting from Defendant's
trespass are temporary in nature, Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for the excessive and
unnecessary damages caused by cutting the ditches and the sloughing and pooling that has
resulted from the easement across the Plaintiffs property, The proper measurement of these

Far West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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damages is the cost to restore the land to its pre-injury state. To do so would cost $42,685.00, but
because this exceeds the value of the property, the Court will reduce the award to the estimated
value, that being $26,600.00,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall pay this mount to Plaintiff with the

statutory post judgment interest rate accruing from today,

District Judge

Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Deoision and Order
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PRANKLM

Piahtiff,
VS.

)

)

Case Nos. CV-03-0000239
CV-03-0000240

1
1

AMENDED .JUDGMENT

1

TOPAZ MARKETING L.P., and Dennis
Lower,

1

Defendants.

j
1

1

1

VILARR RANSOM,as trustee of the Vilarr
B,Ransoin Revocable Trust,

)

TOPAZMARKEIXNG L.P.,and D d s

1
Z

Lower,

)

)

IT IS HEIUCBY ORDERED,ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this
Court's Memora~?durn
Decision dad Order in this case, dated December 5,2007, the
Court hereby entors judgment in favor of Plainflff and awards them $26,600.00,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

District Judge

Fsrr West v. Topaz, Judgment

v

-=a !,:!:I1 1 : z b

iE,
,-'?

THE DXSTRICT COWRT OB THE SWITH SUDICLAL DISTRICT OF
TKE,
... . .
. .. , , . ; , . .

FARR WEST IMrf3SWNTS

8

f.

:

,

. ,. .

;. !- '~- -l .r<?,<!
.,I

DEC. 5 2007 1 l:21AM

Jil"^c

HARDING

NO. 239

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on t
b attomey(s) or person(s) listed below in the m e t indicated.
Attorney(s)Rersons(s):

Method of Service:

3

U.S. MajlPostage Prepaid
J Overnight Mail
DS_ Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ 1 C o w Box
[
[

IGiNNETHE. LYON JR,
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4866
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Te1: (208) 233-1240
Fax (208) 232-88676109

F RANDALL UnVE

[ ] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid

F. RANDALL KLINE CHARTERED
427 N. Main Street, STE.L
PO. Box 397
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397
Tel: (208) 232-9007
Fax: (208) 234-4654

[

Ove~nightMail
Facsimile
[ ] HandDelivered
[ ] Court Box

d

V, ELLIOTT LARSEN
Clerk ofthe District C o w

By:

P.

9

P.01/01

ANSACTION REPOR

D E C / 0 5 / 2 0 0 7 / ~ ~1
D1 3 4 0 A M
FAX(TX)
#

1

DATE

DO~IDEC/OS(

ISTART T.1
RECEIVER
ll:39~~/2328867

1

COM.TIME P A G E
0:51:171
9

)

TYPE/NOTE
OK

1

FILE
~ ~ 3 1 9 7 0 9

P. 01/01

: ANSACTION REPOR
DEC/05/2007/WED
FAX ( T X )

w

/

/

D A T E / S T A R T T.
RECEIVER
O O ~ / D E C / O S 1/ 1 : 4 1 ~ ~ / 2 3 4 4 6 5 4

/COM.TIME/PAGE~
0:01:33j
9

/

1

11:43 A M
TYPE/NOTE

OK

FILE
~ ~ 3 ) 9 7 1 0

Apr.

7 2008 1:36PM

Ke

th

E.

No.

l y o n Jr.,

1933

l.n

KENNETH E. LYON, JR.
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 4 8 6 6
Pocatello, ID 83205
(208) 233-1240
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DEC 1.7 2007

Attorney for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VXLARR RANSOM, as trustee of the
Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust

)

1
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-03-239

)

1
VS.

.

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P , AND,
DENNIS LOWER

MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,
Plaintiff,

.

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P ,
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-03-240

)
)

1
I

Defendants.

)

COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of
record, Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr,, and pursuant to IRCP 11 ( a ) (2)(B),
move the Court for reconsideration of that certain Memorandum
Decision and Order dated December 5 , 2007.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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This motion is made upon the following grounds and for the
following reasons:
1. The property owned by Farr West, and which is the
subject of this litigation, was sold after the appeal
was filed. It is not know exactly when the sale took
place, the value placed on the land, and only the
Plaintiff's attorney has seen the sale documentation.
This documentation and related information is relevant
and crucial information in this case and should be made
available to all parties before a finaldecision can be
reached.
2 , The Court erred in saying "only approximately 7 acres

were injured." There was no testimony as to the amount
of land injured. This is a question of fact yet to be
determined.
3. The Caurt erred in saying "the land is valued at $3,800

per acre." The only testimony on value was by Mr.
Geddes who estimated the land value at $50,000 per
acre, and a real estate appraiser who testified t h e
land had a value of $60'0per acre.

4. The temporary
Decision are

injuries
not

alluded

a proper

to

in

the

Court's

characterization of

the

alleged injuries.

5. Farr West Investments has had two of its five members
die since the appeal. Farr West Investments may no
longer be the real party in interest.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERTlTION
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Lyon Jr,,

1933
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6. The Defendant, Dennis Lower, died on December 27, 2006.
His estate is now a necessary party to this litigation.

Therefore, and in light of the above, the Defendants ask the
Court to reconsider the Memorandum Decision and Order dated
December 5, 2007. Defendants request oral arguments be heard on
this matter.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
day of December, 2007, I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
served true and correct copies
t e foregoing MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION to the following as follows:

&%

F. Randall Kline
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 397
Pocatello. ID 83204

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Courthouse mail box
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 8KTB JVDICXAL m'&TEPIPd0

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS
Plaintiffs,

.Cblrw,
6

j Case Nos. CV-03-0000239 CV-03-0000240
)

1

VS.

) MEMORANDUM DIECISION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

TOPAZ MARKETING L.P., and Dennis
Lower,
Defendants,

)
)

RECONSIDER

)

1
)
)

VILARR RANSOM, as .trustee of the Vilarr )
B, Ransom Revocable Trust,
1
Plaintiff,
1
VS

.

1

TOPAZ MARKETIN@L.P., and Dennis
Lower,
Defendants.

)
)
)

1
)

1

MATTER BEFORE THE COURT:
This case having been decided on December 5,2007, is back before the C o w on the
Defendant's Motionfor Reconsideration. A hearing was held on this motion on April 10,2007,
whereupon the Court took thc matters under advisement.

ISSUES TO BE DETIERMPNED:
1.

Whether the information regarding the sale ofthe land while the matter was on
appeal and the documentation relating to the sale should have been made
available to Defendants?

F u r West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order

31

2.

Whether the Court erred in finding approximately 7 acres of land were injured?

3.

Whether the Court erred in findimg the value ofthe land at %3,800.00per acre?

4-

Whether temporary injuries are a proper characterization of the injuries?

5.

Whegher Farr West is still a real party in interest?

6.

Whetiher the estate of Dennis Lower i s a necessary party to the litigation?

The Defendant brings this motion based on Rule 1l(a)(2)(B) which states;
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be

made at any time before the entry of finaljudgment but not later than fourteen
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of
any order of the trial court made after entry of Anal judgment may be filed within
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no
motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion
filed under Rules SO(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59,1,60(a), or 60(b).
RCP Rule 11
When ruling on motions to reconsider the Court should act consistently with
applicable legal standards, and xeach its decision through an exercise of reason. Curlee v.

Kootenai Coundy Fire & Rescue, 2007 WL 1501383 % (Idaho App. 2007); see also
CarneN v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322 (Idaho 2002). In making a
determination on a motion for reconsiderationthe court may use evidence already before
the court, and the briefs and &davits offered in support of the motion for
reconsideration., Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812 (Idaho 2007)
Rule 1l(a)(2)(BiJpermits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under
that rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson

v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, (Idaho App, 2006).
DISCUSSION:

F a r West v. Topaz, Mamorandum Decision and Order
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Defendant's Motion for Reconsidevation was filed on December 17,2007, 12
days after the Court issued its' ~ e r n o ~ a n d uRecision
m
and Ovder. Therefore the motion

is timely and pnoperly before the Court as per the terms of Rule 1l(a)(2)(B).
1,

Whether the information regarding the sale of the land while the matter was
on appeal, and the documentation relating to the sale should have been made
available to Defendants?

Defendant did not file a memorandum in support of their motion and no case law
was given supporting this argument, This fact or objection was not raised during the
proceedings of ;this case on remand from the Supreme Court, It is a hard thing to require
the unknown from a pasty. Furthermore, the Court finds no such requirement of
disclosure within the law.
2.

Wbetholr the Court erred in finding approximately 7 acres of land were
INured?

In this case the Court was acting as the fact finder, The Court had been on the
disputed premises at tht:request of the parties and had personally observed the amount of
damage to the property. There was ample evidence supporting the finding of the Court
that approximately 7 acres of land had been injured.
3.

Whether the Court erred in finding thevalue of the land at %3,800.00 per
acre?

The evidence in this case supports the finding of the Court that the land is valued

at approximately $3,800.00 per acre. The testimonies as to the value of the land were
duly noted despite their vast disparities. The Court also utilized the market value
evidence which was produced by the parties in document form.
4.

Whether temporary injuries are a proper characterization of the injuries?

Fur West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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In the Court's December 5,2007, Memorandum Decision and Order the Court states;

Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this case are the cuts made on
Plaintiffs land outside of the easement, without permission, the sloughing and
pooling ;caused by the cuts, and the removal and deposit of soil onto Plaintiffs
land. Aocording to the estimate provided by Biggs, these can be restored to their
natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling and measures can
be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the land to its preinjury state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in nature and can be
compensated for by awarding the amount necessary to restore the land to its
condition prior to the injury. The Supreme Court has stated, "[Ilf the cause of the
injury isiabatable or preventabfe and the injury capable of rectificationby
reasonable restoration, Le., not exceeding the damage to the property, the injury
will be considered temporary and not permanent,"Alesko v. Union PaciJic
Railroad Co,, 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can be rectified
the damages are only temporary. In actions of temporary injury to land, the owner
is entitled to recover amount necessary to repair injury and put land in condition it
was at tine immediately preceding injury. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122,
(Ct.App. 1997).
The Cowt charaaterized the injuries to the property according to the definitions
found in case law, The Court found that the injuries were abatable because of the
estimation conducted by Biggs which indicated the land could be restored and the
sloughing stopped, These injuries were preventable and repairable and thus under the
Alesko guidelines are categorized as temporary injuries.
5,

WhetheriFarr West is st% a real party in Merest?
Defendants provide no legal support or new evidence which supports this olaim.

The fact that some of the members of Farr West have passed on is of no legal
oonsequence to this action, The outcome of the case would remain the same had all
parties survived the action.
6.

Whether the Estate o f Dennis Lower is a necessary party to the iitigzltkon?

Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order

40

JUN. 5. 2008 2 : 3 8 P M

J U p c HARDING

Defendants provide no legal support or new evidence which supports this claim,
The fact that Mr. Lower has passed on is of no legal consequence of to this action, The
outcome of the.case would remain the same had all parties survived rhe action. The
effects of the Courts decisions may be felt by the Estate of Dennis Lower however there
is no legal need to include them in matters which were already in progress,

CONCLUSIOR
For the foregoing reasons IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED WWD
ADJUDGED that based upon the findings of law and facts of this case, the Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration is IDEMED.

IT IS SO ORDIEREID.

%ay of June, 2008.

Dated this $
.-

L-.2

Don L. Barding
District Judge

Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5

I hereby certify that on the day of June, 2008 I served a true copy of the foregoing
document on the attomey(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon, by
f~sirnile,or causing the same to be hand delivered.
Attomey(s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

KENNETH E.LYON JR,

Hand Delivered
By U.S,Mail
Fax

I1
[1

Hand Delivered
By U.S.Mail

[

Attorney at Law
P.O.Box 4866
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Tel: (205) 233.1240
Fax: (208) 232.88676109

F RANDALL KLW
F.RANDALL KLNE CEARTERED

W

I

Fax

427 N, Main Stteat, STE. L

P,O. Box 397
PocateUo, Idaho 83204-0397
Tel: (208) 232-9007

Fax: (208) 234-4654

ELLXOT LARSON
Clerk of the District Court

,Deputy Clerk

BY

Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order
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FILED

KENNETH E. LYON, JR.
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 4866
Pocatello, ID 83205
(208) 233-1240
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Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VILARR RANSOM, as trustee of the
Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust

)
)

Case No. CV-03-239

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

1
)
)
)
)
)

vs .

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and,
DENNIS LOWER

Supreme Court No.

1
~efendants/Appellant.

)

)

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,
plaintiff /Respondent,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-03-240

)

vs .

1

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P. , and
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER
Defendants/Appellant.
TO:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)

Ttie above-named Plainti£f/Respondent, VILARR RANSOM, as

trustee of

the Vilarr

B.

Ransom

Revocable

Trust,

and

their

attorney, F. Randall Kline, and Plaintiff/Respondent, FARR WEST
INVESTMENTS, and their attorney, F. Randall Kline, and V. Elliott
Larsen, Clerk of the above-entitled Court:
PAGE

1

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I.
The above-named Appellants, Topaz Marketing, L.P., and Mrs.
Lower, through her attorney of record, Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr.,
appeal against, Farr West Investments the above-named Respondent,
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify, dated May 30, 2007 and
the Motion to Reconsider dated June 5, 2008; and to the failure to
abide by the ruling of the Supreme Court in a prior appeal of this
case; all of these alleged errors were made

by the Honorable Don

L. Harding, District Judge.
11.
Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court, and

the

appealable order

order

described

under

in

and pursuant

Paragraph
to

Rule

I

above

ll(a)(l),

is

an

Idaho

Appellate Rules.
111.
The Issues to be appealed are:

1.

Whether

the Court erred in denying

the Appellant's

Motion to Disqualify the Judge after this case was remanded to
the above Court pursuant to the decision found in Volume 143 Id.
641.
2.
failing
PAGE

2

Whether the court improperly measured actual damages by
to

assess

and

distinguish

NOTICE OF APPEAL

between

costs

to

repair

1

temporary damage to the property and permanent damage to the
property.
3.

Whether

the

court

improperly

measured

damages

in

failing to distinguish between damages attributable to Lower's
permissible trespass to create or maintain an access road and
damages attributable to excessive intrusion exceeding the scope
of the easement.
4,

Whether the Court improperly measured actual damages.

5.

Whether the Court erred in denying Appellant's Motion

for Reconsideration.

IV.
Appellants request preparation of the reporter's transcript
as defined in Rule 25, Idaho Appellate Rules, for the hearing to
Disqualify held April 26, 2007, and the motion to reconsider held
April 10, 2008.

v.
Appellants request the following documents to be included in
the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included
under Rule 28, I.A.R.:

1.

Motion to Disqualify, dated January 3, 2007.

2.

Memorandum

Decision

and

Order

Denying

Defendants'

Motion to Disqualify, dated May 30, 2007.
3.
PAGE

3

Memorandum Decision and Order, dated December 5, 2007.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

4.

Motion for Reconsideration, dated December 17, 2007.

5.

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant' Motion

to Reconsider, dated June 5, 2008.

I certiiy this notice of appeal was properly mailed in the
United States Mail with postage prepaid to all of the parties
required to. be served pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellant Rules,
and further certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on
the reporter
(b)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's

record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2008

PAGE

4

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of July, 2008, 1 mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the
following by placing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid
thereon:
F. Randall Kline
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
P.0 Box 397
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397
Honorable Don L. Harding
District Judge
Caribou County Courthouse
159 South Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Honorable Don L . Harding
District Judge
Franklin County Courthouse
39 W Oneida
Preston. ID 83263
Dorothy Snarr
Court Reporter
159 South Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Clerk of the Court
Franklin County Courthouse
39 W Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DlSTRl
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,

I

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER.

Appeal from:

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County
Honorable Don L. Harding

Case number from court: CV-2003-240
Order or judgment appealed from:

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify dated May 30,
2007 and Motion to Reconsider dated June 5,
2008

Attorney for Appellant: Kenneth E. Lyon
Attorney for Respondent: F. Randall Kline
Appeal by: Defendant
Appeal against: Plaintiff
Notice of Appeal filed: July 10, 2008
Appellate fee paid: Yes

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

DEPUTY

Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: NO
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr
Dated this 15" day of July, 2008

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN

'~.findaHampton, ~ e p u tClerk
j

-

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR
0. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST,
PlaintifftRespondent,
vs

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
DENNIS LOWER,

SUPREME COURT NO. 35494

DefendantsIAppellants.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER,

1, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the following is a
list of exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during the hearing in this
cause:
NONE
1N WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 22"d day of August, 2008.
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

-

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A N D FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******

VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
DENNIS LOWER.
DefendantslAppeIlants.

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,

SUPREME COURT NO. 35494

I

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

I

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER,

I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and
correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and
Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court
at Preston, Idaho, this 22" day of August, 2008.

V. ELLIOTT LARSEN

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
VS

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
DENNIS LOWER,
DefendantsIAppellants.

SUPREME COURT NO. 35494

1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

FARR WEST INVESTMENTS,
PlaintifflRespondent,

I

TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER,
DefendantslAppellants.

I

I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United Stakes Mail,
one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record
in this cause as follows:
F. Randall Kline
F. RANDALL KLINE CHARTERED
PO Box 397
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397

Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 4866
Pocatello, ID 83205

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

B

